A Quantitative Measure of Experimental Scientific Merit by Knuteson, Bruce
A Quantitative Measure of Experimental Scientific Merit
Bruce Knuteson∗
MIT
Experimental program review in our field may benefit from a more quantitative framework within
which to quantitatively discuss the scientific merit of a proposed program of research, and to as-
sess the scientific merit of a particular experimental result. This article proposes explicitly such
a quantitative framework. Examples of the use of this framework in assessing the scientific merit
of particular avenues of research at the energy frontier in many cases provide results in stark con-
tradiction to accepted wisdom. The experimental scientific figure of merit proposed here has the
potential for informing future choices of research direction in our field, and in other subfields of the
physical sciences.
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I. MOTIVATION
In the context of determining which research programs
to pursue, review committees often must decide the rel-
ative scientific merits of proposed experiments. Within
large experiments, deciding which analyses to emphasize
requires similar decisions. These issues arise in the dis-
cussion of experiments or analyses in which the result is
not yet known.
A related issue is faced by those assessing the scientific
merit of an experiment or analysis whose result is known.
This topic is the subject of much innocuous lunchroom
conversation, and more seriously in the evaluation of the
organizations and individuals responsible for producing
the result.
∗URL: http://mit.fnal.gov/~knuteson/; Electronic address:
knuteson@mit.edu
In such a quantitative field as experimental high energy
physics, the discussions leading to these decisions and
evaluations are notably non-quantitative.
The intent of Sec. II is to suggest a quantitative frame-
work for such discussions, including a specific figure of
merit to quantify the scientific merit of a proposed exper-
imental research program, and a specific figure of merit to
quantify the scientific merit of a completed experimental
result. Sec. III provides explicit worked examples.
II. INFORMATION CONTENT
Given the academic and esoteric nature of our field, the
appropriate figure of merit is not expected economic pay-
off, but rather should be formulated in terms of an exper-
iment’s information content. Given the rather grandiose
nature of our field, we will not concern ourselves with
distinguishing qualitatively equivalent but quantitatively
different states of understanding. Whether a Standard
Model Higgs boson exists or not are considered two qual-
itatively different states of understanding; if a Standard
Model Higgs boson exists, whether it has mass 115 GeV
or 160 GeV are considered two qualitatively equivalent
states of understanding.
The appropriate figure of merit to measure an experi-
ment’s information content is well known in the context
of information theory. The original reference is Shan-
non’s classic 1948 paper, “A Mathematical Theory of
Communication” [1]. The essential idea behind this fig-
ure of merit is developed in Sec. II A, with a more sophis-
ticated version developed in Sec. II B.
A. Basic formulation
The value of a particular experimental result in an aca-
demic field clearly should be measured by how much is
learned from the result. Equivalently, the value of a re-
sult is how surprised you are that the particular result
has been obtained.
Suppose an experiment can have one of two out-
comes. Denote the two possibilities by X = {x1, x2},
and let p(x1) and p(x2) represent the expectation of the
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2two possible outcomes x1 and x2 being realized, with
p(x1) + p(x2) = 1. For example, assigning p(x1) = 0.8
and p(x2) = 0.2 represents betting odds of 4:1 in favor
of outcome x1 being obtained. In general, an experiment
will have n possible outcomes X = x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn,
with each outcome xi having expectation p(xi).
The surprise of obtaining the particular result xi is
clearly large if p(xi) is small. The scientific value of the
result xi is therefore large if p(xi) is small. The scientific
value of the result xi is small if p(xi) is near unity, since
in this case little has been learned. The scientific value
of obtaining the result xi must thus be a monotonically
decreasing function of p(xi).
A good measure of scientific merit should have the de-
sired property of addition: the scientific merit of a paper
announcing the discovery of a Standard Model Higgs bo-
son plus the scientific merit of a paper announcing the
discovery of a new Z ′ boson should equal the scientific
merit of a paper containing both discoveries. Equiva-
lently, the act of stapling two papers together should not
change their total scientific merit.
The scientific merit of a particular result xi should
thus (i) be a monotonically decreasing function of the
expectation p(xi) that the result would be obtained, and
(ii) be appropriately additive. This leads uniquely to the
choice [1]
surprisal(xi) = − log10 p(xi) (1)
for the scientific merit of obtaining the result xi. The
negative sign in Eq. 1 is required for the scientific merit to
be a monotonically decreasing function of p(xi), and the
logarithm is required for the scientific merit to have the
desired behavior under addition. The use of logarithm
base ten is arbitrary but convenient, and corresponds to
a choice of units [31] [32].
This article suggests that the surprisal of a particular
experimental result is the appropriate measure of scien-
tific merit for an experiment or analysis whose result is
known. The larger the surprisal of a particular outcome,
the greater its (a posteriori) scientific merit.
A measure of the scientific merit of an experimental
result has thus been obtained in Eq. 1. The definition
of rational behavior is decision making that maximizes
expected payoff. The payoff of obtaining any particular
result xi is given by Eq. 1. The expected payoff is thus the
payoff of each possible result xi, weighted according to
the expectation that the result xi will be obtained. The
expected payoff of an experiment with possible outcomes
X = x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn is thus
H(X) =
∑
i
p(xi) surprisal(xi) = −
∑
i
p(xi) log10 p(xi).
(2)
The expected payoff H(X) is thus the appropriate scien-
tific merit of a proposed experiment, before the result is
known.
Nearly all of the discussion so far can be found in the
first few pages of any introductory information theory
text. The only new idea in this article is that the sur-
prisal and expected surprisal of Eqs. 1 and 2 can actu-
ally be applied in practice to quantify the scientific merit
of completed and proposed high energy physics experi-
ments.
B. Advanced formulation
The previous section introduced the essential idea of
this article. This section completes the development of
necessary concepts.
In the previous section it was implicitly assumed that
each possible experimental outcome corresponds one-to-
one with a qualitatively new state of knowledge. This is
clearly not always the case: flipping a coin can result in
heads or tails, and thus obtaining heads has a nonzero
surprisal according to Eq. 1, but obtaining heads does
not reveal much about how Nature works.
It is thus useful to consider a set of qualitatively
distinct and mutually incompatible states of knowledge
Y = {y1, . . . , yj , . . . , ym}, the jth of which is generally ac-
cepted to be correct with probability p(yj), in the usual
Bayesian interpretation. Since the process of normal sci-
ence relies to a significant degree on a scientific commu-
nity’s shared view of important problems and possible so-
lutions, in practice there is little difficulty defining Y [2].
The possible states of knowledge are complete and mutu-
ally exclusive, so that
∑m
j=1 p(yj) = 1 [33]. An example
might be Y = {y1, y2}, where y1 corresponds to the state
of knowledge in which a Higgs boson is known to exist,
and y2 corresponds to a state of knowledge in which a
Higgs boson is known not to exist. An experiment may
have possible outcomes X = {x1, x2}, where x1 corre-
sponds to the result that a Higgs boson is found, and x2
corresponds to the result that no Higgs boson is found.
Depending on the sensitivity of the experiment, x1 and
x2 may not be in one-to-one correspondence with y1 and
y2. A null result from a Higgs boson search at the Teva-
tron, which is limited by the amount of data collected
and the collider energy, will not prove the Higgs boson
does not exist.
A slightly more sophisticated understanding of
Sec. II A is required. Noting that what counts is the
state of knowledge rather than the particular experimen-
tal outcome, Eq. 2 should be written in terms of Y rather
than X:
H(Y ) = −
∑
j
p(yj) log10 p(yj). (3)
The quantity H(Y ) can be considered to be the entropy
associated with the state of knowledge Y . The state of
knowledge Y is a superposition of orthogonal microstates
yj , each with expectation p(yj). It was implicitly as-
sumed in Sec. II A that the experiment under consid-
eration results in a definitive state of knowledge, where
one microstate yj is selected, corresponding to zero infor-
mation entropy after the result is obtained. In general,
3an experiment may result in a state of knowledge with
nonzero information entropy: if the Higgs boson is not
found at the Tevatron, the resulting state of knowledge
will still consist of a superposition of the two possibilities
that the Higgs boson does or does not exist, with slightly
adjusted relative expectations.
Assume the experimental result xi is obtained. The
expectation that yj is correct was p(yj) before the ex-
periment, and is p(yj |xi) after the experiment [34]. The
information entropy after the experimental result xi is
obtained will be
H(Y |xi) = −
∑
j
p(yj |xi) log10 p(yj |xi), (4)
in analogy with Eq. 3.
Before the experiment is performed, it is not known
what result will be obtained. Before the experiment is
performed, the expected information entropy that will
remain after the experiment is performed is
H(Y |X) =
∑
i
p(xi)H(Y |xi)
= −
∑
i
p(xi)
∑
j
p(yj |xi) log10 p(yj |xi)
= −
∑
i,j
p(xi, yj) log10 p(yj |xi). (5)
Performing an experiment X is thus expected to reduce
the information entropy of our state of knowledge Y from
H(Y ) to the conditional entropy H(Y |X).
Before the experiment is performed, the information
entropy H(Y ) quantifies our degree of uncertainty. Per-
forming the experiment X is expected to reduce this un-
certainty to a smaller information entropy H(Y |X). The
information expected to be gained by performing the ex-
periment X is thus
∆H = H(Y )−H(Y |X). (6)
This article suggests that the expected information
content in a particular experiment or analysis, measured
in terms of the expected reduction in information entropy
∆H, is the appropriate measure of scientific merit for an
experiment or analysis whose result is not yet known.
The larger the expected information content of an exper-
iment, the greater its (a priori) scientific merit.
Experiments that are guaranteed to result in a state of
knowledge of zero entropy have H(Y |X) = 0. For such
experiments, the information content ∆H is equal to the
entropy H(Y ) of the initial state of knowledge.
Assume the state of knowledge yj is actually correct.
The scientific merit of obtaining a particular result xi
should then be the additional evidence
evidence(yj |xi) = log10
p(yj |xi)
p(yj)
(7)
that the experiment can provide in favor of the (correct)
state of knowledge yj . The logarithm again ensures the
desired behavior under addition. As an example, p(yj) =
0.09 and p(yj |xi) = 0.90 results in evidence(yj |xi) = 1,
and the experimental result xi corresponds to one unit
of evidence in favor of yj .
Since in practice the state of knowledge yj is not known
to be correct, the scientific merit of obtaining the exper-
imental result xi is the evidence the result xi provides in
favor of yj , averaged over possibly correct states of knowl-
edge yj , weighted according to the new expectation that
each yj is correct: [35] [36]
information gain (xi) =
∑
j
p(yj |xi) evidence(yj |xi)
=
∑
j
p(yj |xi) log10
p(yj |xi)
p(yj)
.(8)
The scientific merit of the experimental result xi, quan-
tified by Eq. 8 and motivated in terms of a weighted
average of expected evidence, is the appropriate recast-
ing of Eq. 1 in terms of the information gained on the
state of knowledge Y from the experimental result xi.
The information gain defined in Eq. 8 is also sometimes
referred to as information divergence, relative entropy,
or the Kullback–Leibler divergence [3] in the fields of
probability theory and information theory, and the max-
imization of this utility function is referred to as Bayes
d-optimal experimental design [4]. Intuitively, the in-
formation gain is a measure of how much our state of
knowledge has changed as a result of obtaining the out-
come xi. Eq. 8 reduces to the previous Eq. 1 when the
experimental result xi uniquely specifies a corresponding
state of knowledge yj . In this case p(yj |xi) = 1, and
Eq. 1 quantifies our surprise at finding yj to be correct.
Since the information gain is the appropriate measure
of scientific merit of an experimental result xi, the scien-
tific merit of a proposed experiment should be quantified
by the information that would be gained from each pos-
sible experimental outcome, weighted by the expectation
p(xi) that each experimental outcome xi is obtained. The
information content ∆H in an experiment, defined ear-
lier in Eq. 6, can be shown with a few lines of algebra [37]
to be equal to its expected information gain,
∆H =
∑
i
p(xi) information gain (xi), (9)
as required for logical consistency of the concepts that
have been introduced.
This section has introduced an additional level of so-
phistication beyond Sec. II A. The elementary notion of
surprisal in Eq. 1, quantifying the (a posteriori) scien-
tific merit of an experimental result, is replaced by the
information gain of Eq. 8. The elementary notion of in-
formation content in Eq. 2, quantifying the (a priori)
scientific merit of a proposed experiment, is replaced by
Eq. 6.
4C. Synopsis
The essential thesis of this article is summarized in two
sentences.
• The appropriate quantification of scientific merit of
a proposed experiment or analysis (before it is per-
formed and its outcome is known) is the reduction
in information entropy the experiment or analysis
is expected to provide, defined by Eq. 6.
• The appropriate quantification of scientific merit of
an experiment or analysis after the result is known
is the information gained from the result, defined
by Eq. 8.
III. EXAMPLES
The specific figure of merit defined above can be used
to quantify the scientific merit of any experiment or anal-
ysis. This section illustrates the application of this figure
of merit to particular experiments and analyses in the
field of particle physics.
In these examples it will be clear that a priori esti-
mates of the probability of possible outcomes must be
made. No prescription exists for choosing these a priori
probabilities of possible outcomes. The examples below
will nonetheless demonstrate that (1) the same scientific
conclusion is often reached for the full range of justifi-
able a priori probabilities, and (2) the formulation of the
discussion in terms of the assignment of these a priori
probabilities is frequently productive and enlightening.
The fact that there is not a well-developed literature to
point to for the justification of these a priori probabilities
emphasizes the fact that up to this point the importance
of these probabilities has not been properly recognized in
assessing the scientific merit of proposed and completed
experiments.
A. Proposed experiments
For the purposes of the calculations below, the pos-
sibility of new physics being found at Tevatron Run II
is taken to be 20%, with 10% in each of Run IIa and
Run IIb, and with equal probability to be found in any
of roughly 104 potentially interesting kinematic distribu-
tions. A more detailed justification of these numbers is
provided in Appendix A 1. An observed discrepancy is
assumed to contain sufficiently detailed information to
reduce the space of qualitatively different possible expla-
nations for the discrepancy by a factor of 102. These
numbers will naturally be the subject of significant and
productive debate in any real program review. One of the
purposes of the calculations below is to provide intuition
for the way in which conclusions change with different
probability assignments, and the extent to which they
do not.
• Flipping a coin has two possible outcomes. Let
x1 denote the experimental outcome in which the
coin comes up heads, and let x2 denote the ex-
perimental outcome in which the coin comes up
tails. Let y1 denote the state of knowledge in
which the Standard Model Higgs boson is known
to exist, and let y2 denote the state of knowl-
edge in which the Standard Model Higgs boson
is known not to exist. Whether the coin comes
up heads or tails tells us absolutely nothing about
whether the Standard Model Higgs boson exists
or not; hence p(y1|x1) = p(y1|x2) = p(y1), and
p(y2|x1) = p(y2|x2) = p(y2). In words, our de-
gree of belief p(y1|x1) that the Higgs boson ex-
ists given that the coin comes up heads is equal
to our degree of belief p(y1|x2) that the Higgs bo-
son exists given that the coin comes up tails, which
in turn is equal to our degree of belief p(y1) that
the Higgs boson exists before performing the ex-
periment. In this case from Eq. 5 the expected
information entropy after performing the experi-
ment H(Y |X) = −∑i,j p(xi, yj) log10 p(yj |xi) =
−∑j p(yj) log10 p(yj) = H(Y ), the information en-
tropy before performing the experiment, and the
scientific merit of this experiment is ∆H = H(Y )−
H(Y |X) = 0.
This example illustrates that ∆H quantifies scien-
tific merit (and not merely the number of possible
experimental outcomes) through its treatment of
qualitatively different states of scientific knowledge
Y . Experiments with varied possible outcomes X
that do not inform the probabilities we assign to
the qualitative states of knowledge Y have zero sci-
entific merit.
• The µ2e experiment [38] has two possible outcomes.
Appendix A 2 argues that an excess of muon to elec-
tron conversions will be observed with an expecta-
tion of ≈ 18%. With probability of 1− 0.18 = 0.82
results consistent with the Standard Model will
be obtained. In either case the experiment re-
sults in a state of knowledge with zero informa-
tion entropy, so H(Y |X) = 0. The information
content in this analysis is thus ∆H = H(Y ) −
H(Y |X) = H(Y )−0 = −(0.18×log10(0.18)+0.82×
log10(0.82)) ≈ 2e-01 [39].
The most important factor for determining the sci-
entific merit of this analysis is the estimated prob-
ability of 18% of observing an excess of muon to
electron conversions, which sets the scale for the
computed scientific merit. Note that for an experi-
ment such as µ2e with binary outcome the scientific
merit is maximal when the estimated probability
for a signal is 50%.
• A search for single top has two possible outcomes.
As argued in Appendix A 1, with probability 1 −
10−5 = 0.99999 single top will be found as pre-
5dicted by the Standard Model, treating this anal-
ysis as just one of 104 distributions that can be
considered in Tevatron Run II. With probability
10−5 single top will be found to not be consistent
with the Standard Model prediction. The expected
reduction in information entropy from this anal-
ysis is thus ∆H = H(Y ) − H(Y |X) = H(Y ) −
0 = −(10−5 × log10(10−5) + (1 − 10−5) log10(1 −
10−5)) ≈ 5e-05.
The dominant factor in determining the scientific
merit of this analysis is seen to be the estimated
probability of not observing single top as predicted
by the Standard Model. In this example, as in all
others, the possibility of an outright experimental
mistake is ignored.
• A search for a gluino (g˜) has ∼ 101 possible out-
comes. The probability for new physics to be found
in Tevatron Run IIa is 10%, with this probabil-
ity divided equally among 104 distributions. The
probability for new physics to be found in the par-
ticular distribution used in the gluino analysis is
thus 10%/104 = 10−5. If new physics is found, the
signal events will contain information that should
narrow down the qualitatively different possible ex-
planations for a discrepancy in this distribution by
a factor of 102. That is, for every 100 qualita-
tively different plausible interpretations (Bard sto-
ries [5]) that could be proposed for seeing a discrep-
ancy in the particular kinematic distribution con-
sidered, the characteristics of the observed events
are expected to allow the elimination of 99 of them.
The probability that no new physics is found in
this analysis is 1− 10−5. There are thus 102 possi-
ble outcomes with probability 10−7 corresponding
to 102 possible different states of understanding in
the event of a discovery, and one possible outcome
with probability 1− 10−5 = 0.99999 corresponding
to no discovery. The information content in this
analysis is ∆H = H(Y ) −H(Y |X) = H(Y ) − 0 =
−(102×10−7× log10(10−7)+(1−10−5)× log10(1−
10−5)) ≈ 7e-05.
The dominant factor in determining the scientific
merit of this analysis is seen to be the estimated
probability for discovery, which sets the scale of
10−5, adjusted slightly by the decimal logarithm of
the estimated power of the analysis for discriminat-
ing among competing interpretations in the event of
a discovery. This analysis can be taken as a proxy
for any similar dedicated Tevatron search.
• A search for the Standard Model Higgs boson at
the Tevatron has (qualitatively) three possibilities.
The Standard Model Higgs boson exists with prob-
ability 95%, and does not exist with probability 5%.
If the Standard Model Higgs boson exists, it will be
seen at the Tevatron with probability 10%. Possi-
bilities are that the Standard Model Higgs boson
exists and is seen at the Tevatron, with probabil-
ity p(exists, observed) = 95% × 10% = 0.095; that
the Higgs boson exists but is not seen at the Teva-
tron, with probability p(exists, !observed) = 95%×
90% = 0.855; and that the Higgs boson does not ex-
ist and is not seen at the Tevatron, with probability
p(!exists, !observed) = 5%. The entropy of the state
of knowledge before the experiment is performed is
H(Y ) = H(exists?) = −(0.95× log10 0.95 + 0.05×
log10 0.05) ≈ 0.086 [40]. Unlike the previous ex-
amples, in which the experiment results in an in-
formation state with zero entropy, in the search
for the Higgs boson at the Tevatron we may be
left in an information state with non-zero entropy.
The scientific merit is the expected reduction in
entropy ∆H = H(Y ) − H(Y |X) = H(exists?) −
H(exists?|observed?) that will be provided by
the experiment, where H(exists?|observed?) =
−(p(exists, observed) × log10 p(exists|observed) +
p(exists, !observed) × log10 p(exists|!observed) +
p(!exists, !observed) × log10 p(!exists|!observed)) ≈
−(0.095× log10(1) + 0.855 × log10(0.945) + 0.05 ×
log10(0.055)) ≈ 0.084. The scientific merit is thus
calculated to be ∆H = H(Y )−H(Y |X) ≈ 0.086−
0.084 = 2e-03.
The important factors for determining the scientific
merit of this analysis are the estimated probability
of 95% of observing the Higgs, which sets the scale
of a few ×10−2, and the estimated probability of
10% that the experiment will provide an unambigu-
ous answer, which reduces the scientific merit to a
few ×10−3.
• Rewinding back to the year 2003, the Tevatron
Bs mixing measurement with 1 fb−1 of integrated
luminosity similarly has (qualitatively) three
possibilities. With initial results from the B fac-
tories already in hand, the Standard Model CKM
picture will be insufficient to accommodate the
Tevatron measurement of ∆ms with probability
10−5, as argued in Appendix A 1. The projected
sensitivity of the CDF Bs mixing analysis with
1 fb−1 is ∆ms = 30 ps−1. The Standard Model
can accommodate a value of ∆ms up to and
including 30 ps−1 at 95% confidence level. If
the CKM picture is sufficient, with probability
95% a measurement of ∆ms will made with
∆ms < 30 ps−1, confirming that the Standard
Model CKM picture is indeed sufficient. Pos-
sibilities are that the CKM picture is sufficient
and Bs mixing will be observed, with probability
p(ckm, observed) = 0.99999 × 95% ≈ 0.94999;
that the CKM picture is sufficient but
∆ms is sufficiently large that Bs mixing is
not seen at the Tevatron, with probability
p(ckm, !observed) = 0.99999 × 5% ≈ 0.0499995;
and that the CKM picture is insufficient
and Bs mixing is not seen at the Tevatron,
6with probability p(!ckm, !observed) = 10−5.
The entropy of the state of knowledge
before the experiment is performed is
H(Y ) = H(ckm?) = −(0.99999 × log10 0.99999 +
0.00001× log10 0.00001) ≈ 5× 10−5 [41]. As in the
previous Higgs example, this experiment may re-
sult in an information state with non-zero entropy.
The appropriate figure of merit is the entropy
reduction ∆H = H(Y ) − H(Y |X) = H(ckm?) −
H(ckm?|observed?), where H(ckm?|observed?) =
−(p(ckm, observed) × log10 p(ckm|observed) +
p(ckm, !observed) × log10 p(ckm|!observed) +
p(!ckm, !observed) × log10 p(!ckm|!observed)) ≈
−(0.94999× log10(1) + 0.0499995× log10(0.9998) +
10−5 × log10(0.0002)) ≈ 4 × 10−5. The scientific
merit is the reduction in information entropy
expected to be provided by the experiment,
calculated to be ∆H = H(Y ) − H(Y |X) ≈
5× 10−5 − 4× 10−5 = 1e-05.
The most important factor for determining the sci-
entific merit of this analysis is the estimated prob-
ability of 10−5 of not observing Bs mixing, which
sets the scale of a few ×10−5. Unfortunately the
sensitivity of this analysis is such that it is unable
to cash in on the (sur)prize of providing conclu-
sive evidence that the CKM picture is insufficient.
It is instructive to see how this limited sensitivity
(resulting in the number of 5% in the calculation
above) propagates through the calculation into a
relatively large value for H(Y |X), resulting in an
expected information entropy H(Y |X) = 4× 10−5
after the measurement that is comparable to the
information entropy H(Y ) = 5 × 10−5 before the
measurement, leaving an expected information gain
of only ∆H = 1× 10−5.
• A global analysis of all Tevatron Run II data will
discover nothing with a probability of 80%. With
probability 20% a discovery will be made in one of
104 distributions considered, with 102 qualitatively
different possible states of understanding resulting
from a discrepancy observed in any of these dis-
tributions. In the event of a discovery, there are
thus 106 possible states of understanding, each with
probability 2 × 10−7. The information content in
this analysis is thus ∆H = H(Y )−0 = −(106×(2×
10−7)× log10(2×10−7)+80%× log10(80%)) = 1.4.
The dominant factors influencing the scientific
merit of this analysis are the estimated probability
of 20% of discovering new physics at Tevatron Run
II, which sets the scale of 0.2, and the decimal log-
arithm of the power of the analysis to discriminate
among possible interpretations, which provides an
additional factor of seven.
• Integrating over all analyses that will be performed
at the CERN Large Hadron Collider in the next five
years, a significant discovery will be made with a
Analysis Merit Cost Bang per buck
(M$) (Merit per M$)
LHC, all searches 7 5e+03 1e-03
Tevatron II global search 1.4 3e-01 5
µ2e 2e-01 1e+02 2e-03
Tevatron Higgs search 2e-03 1e+01 2e-04
Bs mixing 1e-05 1e+01 1e-06
g˜ search 7e-05 1e-01 7e-04
single top search 5e-05 5 1e-05
flipping a coin 0 1e-07 0
TABLE I: The scientific merit of selected experiments and
analyses, calculated in terms of expected information content
∆H with decimal logarithm as described in the text, and
ordered according to decreasing merit. Estimated incremental
cost for each experiment or analysis is provided in units of
millions of U.S. dollars. Scientific “bang per buck” is obtained
by dividing the calculated merit by the estimated incremental
cost.
probability of 90%. The space of new physics mod-
els is so large that there are ∼ 108 qualitatively dis-
tinct states of possible understanding accessible in
the event of a discovery. With probability of 10% a
Standard Model Higgs boson will be seen and noth-
ing else. The information content in the entire LHC
is thus ∆H = H(Y )− 0 = −(108× (90%× 10−8)×
log10(90%× 10−8) + 10%× log10(10%)) = 7.4.
In this case the O(1) discovery potential sets the
scale for LHC’s scientific merit, and the power of
the direct production of new states to distinguish
among competing interpretations provides an addi-
tional factor of seven.
The assignment of a priori probabilities above is cer-
tainly open for debate, and the reader may object that
the problem of quantifying an experiment’s scientific
merit has simply been reformulated in terms of the esti-
mation of the probabilities of possible experimental out-
comes. At worst, this reformulation significantly changes
and focuses the discussion. In most cases, the scien-
tific conclusion drawn from this reformulation is robust
against the variation of these estimated probabilities
within their justifiable range. In cases where the scien-
tific conclusion is not robust against such variation, this
framework points out precisely what factors are impor-
tant. The fact that there is not a well-developed liter-
ature to point to for the justification of the above esti-
mated probabilities emphasizes the fact that until now
these estimated probabilities have not been regarded as
the important ingredients in assessing the scientific merit
of proposed and completed experiments.
The scientific merit of the proposed experiments and
analyses considered above can in this way be quantified
and ordered, as in Table I. Also included in this table
is an estimated incremental cost for performing the ex-
periment or analysis, which is subject as always to some
ambiguity in the choice of accounting [42]. Dividing the
7scientific merit by the estimated cost provides a “scien-
tific bang per buck,” in units of information content per
million dollars. Since information entropy has the de-
sired behavior under addition (in the sense that if two
experiments together provide the same information as a
third experiment, the sum of the merits of the first two
experiments equals the merit of the third), the scientific
merit per unit cost is appropriate for judging the most
cost effective allocation of limited resources, and for com-
paring experiments of significantly different scales. This
“scientific bang per buck” provides a quantitative frame-
work for advocates of experiments of all sizes to argue
their cases on even footing, and for review panels to as-
sess such cases on even footing.
In this context, the value of making data publicly avail-
able (such as through Quaero [6, 7]) is to reduce the cost
of dedicated analysis (such as the g˜ search in Table I)
from 100 k$ (corresponding to two years of a graduate
student’s time) to 100 $ (corresponding to two hours of
a graduate student’s time), increasing the scientific bang
per buck for such a search by three orders of magnitude.
Table I is particularly interesting and potentially valu-
able to the extent that its conclusions are at odds with
accepted wisdom of the relative scientific merit of the
experiments and analyses listed. If indeed the figure of
merit proposed here is a suitable measure of the scien-
tific merit of an experiment or analysis, then accepted
wisdom can be dangerously misleading. If accepted wis-
dom is correct, then there should exist an alternative and
justifiably more appropriate quantifiable figure of merit
than the one proposed in this article. If the latter, this
article should help motivate its development.
B. Completed experiments
The figure of merit suggested for assessing the scien-
tific merit of a completed experiment is the information
gained from the result obtained, quantified by Eq. 8. This
section illustrates the application of this figure of merit to
historical, recent, and hypothetical future experimental
results in our field.
In these examples, as in those in the previous section,
it will be clear that estimates of the probability of possi-
ble outcomes must be made. For completed experiments,
like for future experiments, the relevant probabilities are
those that quantify our expectation of probable outcomes
before the execution of the experiment. Here as before,
no prescription exists for choosing these a priori prob-
abilities of possible outcomes. The examples below will
nonetheless demonstrate again that (1) the same scien-
tific conclusion is often reached for the full range of jus-
tifiable a priori probabilities, and (2) the formulation of
the discussion in terms of the assignment of these a pri-
ori probabilities is frequently productive and enlighten-
ing. Provided historical references, although not explic-
itly quantifying expectation, nonetheless give a flavor of
the rhetoric of the time that can be used to justify rea-
sonable a priori probabilities.
• Returning to the example of the flipped coin, let
x1 denote the experimental outcome in which the
coin comes up heads, x2 the experimental outcome
in which the coin comes up tails, y1 the state of
knowledge in which the Standard Model Higgs bo-
son is known to exist, and y2 the state of knowledge
in which the Standard Model Higgs boson is known
not to exist. As before, p(y1|x1) = p(y1|x2) =
p(y1), and p(y2|x1) = p(y2|x2) = p(y2). Assume
the coin comes up heads: the experimental out-
come x1 is realized.
In this case from Eq. 8 the information gain
of this outcome is −∑j p(yj |x1) log10 p(yj)p(yj |x1) =
−∑j p(yj) log10 p(yj)p(yj) = −∑j p(yj) log10 1 = 0.
The scientific merit of this experimental outcome,
quantified by its information gain, is 0.
• Before the W and Z bosons were discovered [8, 9,
10, 11], these electroweak gauge bosons were ex-
pected to exist with a degree of confidence suffi-
ciently high that the Spp¯S was specifically designed
and built for their discovery [12]. In the late 1970’s,
the W and Z bosons were assumed to exist with a
probability of 95% [13]. The information gain of
the discovery of these gauge bosons in 1983 was
thus − log10(95%) ≈ 0.02.
• Before the top quark was discovered at Fermilab
in 1995 [14, 15], it was assumed to exist with
a degree of confidence sufficiently high that the
Tevatron to a great extent was specifically de-
signed and built for this discovery [16]. In the late
1980’s, the top quark was assumed to exist with a
probability of 95% [17]. The information gain of
the discovery of the top quark in 1995 was thus
− log10(95%) ≈ 0.02.
• In 1990, it was believed with a probability of 30%
that new electroweak scale physics (such as super-
symmetry) would appear in the running of Teva-
tron Run I or LEP 2. The suprisal that no new
physics was discovered at Tevatron Run I or LEP 2
was thus − log10(1− 30%) ≈ 0.15 [43].
• The discovery of the J/Ψ [18, 19] was largely unan-
ticipated; in 1973 few professional physicists took
the notion of physical quarks seriously [20]. The
expectation that experiments at Brookhaven and
SLAC would produce evidence of a narrow reso-
nance confirming the physicality of the quark pic-
ture was small, corresponding to a probability of
∼ 10−2. The information gain of the discov-
ery of the J/Ψ in November of 1974 was thus
− log10(10−2) = 2.
• The discovery of the τ lepton [21, 22, 23] was also
quite unanticipated; in the early 1970’s experimen-
tal results fit nicely into a framework with only two
8generations of fermions. Indeed, there was less the-
oretical motivation for expecting the τ lepton than
expecting to see the J/Ψ [24]. The expectation that
a third generation would be discovered thus corre-
sponded to a probability even less than the number
used above for the J/Ψ discovery. If the a priori
probability of a SLAC experiment producing evi-
dence for a τ lepton in 1977 is taken to be 10−3,
then the information gain of this experimental re-
sult is − log10(10−3) = 3.
• By 1977, the existence of a third generation of lep-
tons was established [23]. The expectation within
the community at this time that a b quark would
be observed can be estimated to correspond to a
probability of ∼ 30% [25]. The discovery of the
Υ [26] thus represents an experimental result with
scientific merit equal to − log10(30%) ≈ 0.5.
• The determination of ∆ms has recently been im-
proved at the Tevatron with 1 fb−1 of integrated
luminosity through an analysis of Bs mixing [27].
Before the observation of Bs mixing, the CKM pic-
ture was expected to provide an inadequate de-
scription of this phenomenon with a probability
of 10−5. Quantified in terms of information gain,
the scientific merit of this experimental result is
− log10(0.99999) = 4e-06.
• A search for a gluino (g˜) has been performed at the
Tevatron, with no evidence of new physics found.
From the previous section, the probability of find-
ing a gluino in this search was 10−5. The scien-
tific merit of the result of this search, in which
no evidence of physics beyond the Standard Model
is found, is quantified by a information gain of
− log10(0.99999) = 4e-06.
• A global analysis of CDF Run IIa high-pT data has
recently been performed [28, 29], and no evidence of
new physics has been found. Using numbers from
the previous section, the probability that no evi-
dence of new physics would be found in this anal-
ysis was 90%. The scientific merit of this result is
thus equal to − log10(90%) = 0.05.
• Fast-forwarding in time, consider the scientific
merit of a null result obtained in a global search
of Tevatron Run IIb high-pT data. Using numbers
from the previous section, the probability that no
evidence of new physics would be found in these
data is 90%. The scientific merit of such a result
would thus be equal to − log10(90%) = 0.05.
The total scientific merit of a null result being ob-
tained in global searches at Tevatron Run IIa and
Tevatron Run IIb would be 0.05 + 0.05 = 0.10.
• Fast-forwarding in time, consider the scientific
merit of the discovery of a Standard Model Higgs
boson. The overwhelming expectation of the field
Result Merit Cost Bang per buck
(M$) (Merit per M$)
τ discovery 3 6e-01 5e+00
J/Ψ discovery 2 1e+01 2e-01
there is no Higgs† 1.3 5e+03 3e-04
Υ discovery 5e-01 1 5e-01
null Tevatron I + LEP 2 2e-01 3e+03 6e-05
global null Tevatron IIa 5e-02 3e-01 2e-01
global null Tevatron IIb† 5e-02 3e-01 2e-01
W and Z discoveries 2e-02 5e+02 4e-05
top quark discovery 2e-02 5e+01 4e-04
Higgs discovery† 2e-02 5e+03 4e-06
Bs mixing observation 4e-06 1e+01 4e-07
g˜ search 4e-06 1e-01 4e-05
single top discovery† 4e-06 5 4e-06
coin comes up heads 0 1e-07 0
TABLE II: Table of the scientific merit of selected historical,
recent, and hypothetical future (†) experimental results, cal-
culated in terms of information gain with decimal logarithm
as described in the text, and ordered according to decreas-
ing merit. Estimated incremental cost for each experiment or
analysis is provided in units of millions of U.S. dollars. Scien-
tific “bang per buck” is obtained by dividing the calculated
merit by the estimated incremental cost.
is that a Standard Model Higgs boson exists, with
a probability taken to be ∼ 95%. The informa-
tion gain of obtaining this experimental result is
− log10(95%) = 0.02. If the LHC instead rules
out the possibility of the existence of a Standard
Model like Higgs boson, the scientific merit of such
a result would be significantly greater, with infor-
mation gain equal to − log10(5%) = 1.3.
• Fast-forwarding in time, consider the scientific
merit of the discovery of Standard Model single
top production. The overwhelming expectation is
that the top quark is produced singly in pp¯ colli-
sions as predicted by the Standard Model. Taking
the probability that Nature does not singly produce
top quarks from the previous section to be 10−5, as
argued in Appendix A 1, the scientific merit of the
discovery of single top production is quantified by
a information gain of − log10(0.99999) = 4e-06.
The assignment of probabilities of possible outcomes
above is certainly open for debate. The claim is made
that the physics discussion of these probabilities forms a
particularly focused, fruitful, and constructive framework
for assessing the scientific merit of experimental results.
The scientific merit of the experimental results con-
sidered above can thus be quantified and ordered, as in
Table II. Also included in this table is an estimated in-
cremental cost for performing the experiment or analy-
sis, which is subject as always to some ambiguity in the
choice of accounting. Dividing the scientific merit by the
9estimated cost provides a “scientific bang per buck,” in
units of information content per million dollars.
Table II is particularly interesting and potentially valu-
able to the extent that its conclusions are at odds with
accepted wisdom of the relative scientific merit of the ex-
periments and analyses listed. Note that the scientific
merit, quantified in terms of the information gain, obeys
the desired property of addition, such that if two exper-
iments together come to the same conclusion as a third
experiment, then the sum of the scientific merits of the
first two experimental results is equal to the scientific
merit of the third result. The scientific merit of the dis-
covery of the τ lepton is seen to equal the total scientific
merit of all other present and past experimental results
listed in Table II, a conclusion that is robust against rea-
sonable variation in estimated prior probabilities. The
scientific merit of a Tevatron global search is seen to be
104 times that of a dedicated, model-dependent Tevatron
search, consistent with the relative scope of data space
analyzed in each case. The scientific merit of the com-
bined null result of Tevatron I and LEP 2 is measured
to be twice the combined scientific merit of the discov-
ery of the W boson, the discovery of the Z boson, the
discovery of the top quark, and a future Higgs boson dis-
covery. The scientific merit of not finding a Standard
Model Higgs boson at the LHC is nearly two orders of
magnitude larger than the scientific merit of discovering
the Standard Model Higgs boson. The scientific mer-
its of the “discoveries” of the W boson, Z boson, top
quark, Standard Model Higgs, Bs mixing, and single top
production range from two to five orders magnitude less
than the scientific merits of the “null results” that would
have corresponded to a non-observation.
IV. SUMMARY
The choice of a reasonable quantitative figure of merit
for assessing the scientific merit of proposed experiments
can inform and focus program review and accompany-
ing decisions of resource allocation in many subfields of
the physical sciences. The related choice of a reasonable
figure of merit for assessing the scientific merit of any
particular experimental result would inform the evalu-
ation of those organizations and individuals responsible
for the production of the result.
This article advocates that the amount of information
an experiment is expected to provide is the appropriate
figure of merit for assessing the scientific merit of any
experiment whose result is not yet known. The amount
of information an experiment is expected to provide is a
concept with a well developed theory that is nearly sixty
years old, quantified by a change in information entropy
∆H in the context of information theory.
This article advocates that the extent to which an ex-
perimental result surprises provides the appropriate fig-
ure of merit for assessing the scientific merit of any spe-
cific experimental result. The extent to which an experi-
mental result surprises is also an elementary notion in the
context of information theory, quantified by the result’s
information gain.
Use of information content or information gain to eval-
uate the scientific merit of experiments requires the esti-
mation of the probabilities of qualitatively different out-
comes, and the reader may object that the problem of
quantifying an experiment’s scientific merit has simply
been reformulated in terms of the estimation of the prob-
abilities of possible experimental outcomes. At worst,
this reformulation significantly changes and focuses the
discussion. The fact that there is not a well-developed
literature to point to for the justification of these a priori
probabilities emphasizes the fact that until now the im-
portance of these probabilities has not been properly rec-
ognized in assessing the scientific merit of proposed and
completed experiments. In most cases, the scientific con-
clusion drawn from this reformulation is robust against
the variation of these estimated probabilities within their
justifiable range. From Tables I and II, it is seen that the
scientific merit per incremental unit cost ranges over five
orders of magnitude for the representative experiments
and analyses considered.
The reader may object to the very idea of constructing
an explicit figure of merit to quantify the scientific merit
of experiments. Such a reader misses the point that this
is done (implicitly, if not explicitly) every time a deci-
sion of resource allocation is made. It is surely in the
field’s best interest for such evaluations to be made in
the sharpest, most open, most quantifiable, and scientif-
ically best motivated framework possible.
The reader may object to the specific figure of merit
advocated in this article, particularly if his or her exper-
iment scores poorly. Such a reader is challenged to find
a scientifically better motivated figure of merit.
Presumably nearly all readers will take issue with a
few of the numbers in the examples. Readers should use
these to assess for themselves the claims made at the
beginning of Sec. III: (1) the same scientific conclusion
is often reached for the full range of justifiable a priori
probabilities, and (2) the formulation of the discussion in
terms of the assignment of these a priori probabilities is
frequently productive and enlightening.
In the context of the scientific merit advocated in this
article, the point of making frontier energy collider data
publicly available (such as with Quaero [6, 7]) is to re-
duce the cost of an analysis like the g˜ search in Tables I
and II from ∼$100,000 to ∼$100, increasing the scien-
tific bang per buck of such an analysis by three orders of
magnitude.
The figure of merit described here may provide a
novel and useful quantitative framework within which
(HEPAP, P5, NSF, and DoE) decisions about future re-
source allocation can be made.
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF EXPECTATION
This appendix provides arguments for the numbers
used to quantify expectation in the main text of this ar-
ticle. The quantitative measure introduced in this article
is sufficiently novel that the field so far has little practice
with the type of argument required; reference to existing
literature is in most cases insufficient. The quantitative
arguments constructed below are almost certainly also in-
sufficient in some respects, but are provided as a starting
point for further improvement and discussion.
1. LEP, Tevatron, and LHC
This section argues the discovery probabilities of LEP,
the Tevatron, and the Large Hadron Collider. A prior
is constructed to represent our expectation in 1990 that
the first sign of physics beyond the Standard Model will
appear at or slightly above the electroweak scale. This
prior is then evolved through the experimental realities
of Tevatron Run I and LEP 2 to update expectation to
the year 2000. This expectation is then evolved through
the experimental reality of Tevatron Run IIa and a hy-
pothetical null result in Tevatron Run IIb to determine
what fraction of expectation from 2000 is left at the end
of Tevatron running in 2010. The fraction of expecta-
tion from 1990 that has been eliminated by 2000, 2010,
and 2020 (corresponding to the discovery probabilities of
LEP, the Tevatron, and the LHC) is determined.
Prior probabilities can be defined given the field’s
knowledge in 1990, before Tevatron Run I (1990-1996)
or LEP 2 (1996-2000). The production of a new process
beyond the Standard Model is largely characterized by
an overall coupling strength g and the mass m of the
new state that is produced. Our knowledge circa 1990
is thus characterized by a prior p(g,m|1990) for the cou-
pling g and the mass m of the most accessible non Stan-
dard Model physics process. This prior is assumed to
factorize, such that
p(g,m|1990) = p(g|1990) p(m|1990). (A1)
The prior for the coupling p(g|1990) is taken to be
uniform between 0 and 1.5, noting that for weak pro-
cesses g =
√
4piαEM ≈ 0.3 and that for strong processes
g =
√
4piαs ≈ 1.2. Explicitly,
p(g|1990) = (0 < g < 1.5)/1.5, (A2)
where (0 < g < 1.5) evaluates to 1 if true, and 0 if false.
The prior p(m|1990) for the massm of the most accessible
new state is taken to be
p(m|1990) = m
λ2
exp (−m/λ), (A3)
where λ = 150 GeV sets the peak of the distribution
p(m|1990), as shown in Fig. 1(a). This prior reflects the
prejudice that new physics should appear at or slightly
above the mass of the W and Z bosons. The joint prior
p(g,m|1990) is shown in Fig. 1(b).
The proton and antiproton parton distrubtion func-
tions are such that the single particle production cross
section (pp¯ → X) falls by a factor of two for every in-
crease of m by λ1/2 = 40 GeV, holding g constant. By
the same argument, the pair production cross section
(pp¯ → XX¯) falls by a factor of two for every increase
of m by 20 GeV, holding g constant. Letting n = 1 de-
note single particle production and n = 2 denote pair
production, the number of signal events s varies with g,
m, n, and the integrated luminosity L according to
s ∝ Lg2 2−nm/λ1/2 . (A4)
The number of background events b varies only with the
integrated luminosity, so that b ∝ L. Combining these,
the figure of merit is
s√
b
∝
√
Lg2 2−nm/λ1/2 . (A5)
In Tevatron Run I, the top quark was discovered at
the edge of experimental sensitivity. This discovery cor-
responded to the strong coupling g = 1.2, a mass m equal
to the top quark mass mt = 175 GeV, pair production
of n = 2, and an integrated luminosity of L ≈ 100 pb−1.
Inserting these numbers into Eq. A4 yields
s√
b
∣∣∣∣
top
∝
√
100 pb−1 (1.2)2 2−2mt/λ1/2 . (A6)
Taking the top quark discovery as a relevant benchmark,
a new process characterized by g, m, and n will be ob-
served at the Tevatron after collecting an integrated lu-
minosity L if√
L
100 pb−1
( g
1.2
)2 2−nm/λ1/2
2−2mt/λ1/2
> 1, (A7)
where this expression is obtained by dividing Eq. A5 by
Eq. A6. Equation A7 implies that given the existence of
a new physics process characterized by a coupling g, a
mass scale m, and single or pair production n, the prob-
ability of observing a null result at the Tevatron upon
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FIG. 1: (a) The distribution p(m|1990), representing 1990 expectation for the mass of the next non Standard Model particle to
be discovered. The scale of all mass axes is in units of GeV, and all distributions extend past the 500 GeV upper threshold used
in constructing these plots. (b) The distribution p(g,m|1990), representing the joint prior expectation for the coupling g and
mass m characterizing the next non Standard Model particle to be discovered. (c) The distribution p(g,m|1996), reflecting our
prior from 1990 with the understanding gained from the null result of Tevatron Run I. The effect of Tevatron Run I is to “zero”
a substantial piece of the 1990 prior. What is left is renormalized to unit integral. This and subsequent plots show the case of
pair production, with n = 2. The shape of the region zeroed by Tevatron Run I is determined considering the top quark as a
representative benchmark for the sensitivity of Tevatron Run I in the variable space of coupling g and mass m, as described
in the text. (d) The distribution p(g,m|2000), reflecting the previous distribution with the additional knowledge of the null
result from LEP 2. The effect of LEP 2 is to zero that part of the density with m < 100 GeV. (e) The distribution p(g,m|2006),
reflecting the previous distribution with the additional knowledge of the null result of Tevatron Run IIa. The effect of Tevatron
Run IIa is to zero ≈ 10% of the density in the previous distribution. (f) The distribution p(g,m|2010), reflecting the previous
distribution assuming a null result is obtained in Tevatron Run IIb. The effect of Tevatron Run IIb is to zero ≈ 12% of the
density in the previous distribution. All distributions (a)–(f) integrate to unity. As a sanity check, note that the Standard
Model Higgs (g ≈ 0.3,m ≈ 130) and single top production (g ≈ 0.3,m ≈ 175) are at the mode of p(g,m|2006).
the accumulation of integrated luminosity equal to L is
p(tev(L)|1990, g,m) =
g < 1.2× 2(nm/2−mt)/λ1/2(
L
100 pb−1
)1/4
 ,
(A8)
where the right hand side is just a rewriting of Eq. A7,
using the notation that the boolean expression evaluates
to 1 if true, and 0 if false.
The expectation in 1990 that new physics would be
seen at Tevatron Run I or LEP 2 is determined to be
1− p(tev1, lep2|1990) = 30%. (A9)
Letting p(g,m|1996) denote our knowledge in 1996,
comprising the prior from 1990 plus the additional knowl-
edge (tev1 = tev(100 pb−1)) of no processes beyond the
Standard Model having been observed in Tevatron Run
I, from application of Bayes’s theorem
p(g,m|1996) = p(g,m|1990, tev1)
=
p(g,m, tev1|1990)
p(tev1|1990)
=
p(tev1|1990, g,m)p(g,m|1990)
p(tev1|1990) .(A10)
Here p(tev1|1990, g,m) is defined by Eq. A8, and
p(tev1|1990) quantifies the probability of having obtained
the null Tevatron Run I result given our knowledge in
1990, representing the density left in going from Fig. 1(b)
to Fig. 1(c), which shows a plot of p(g,m|1996).
Summarizing the null result from LEP 2 as ruling out
the possibility that m/n < 200 GeV leads to
p(lep2|1996, g,m) = (m
n
> 200 GeV), (A11)
using again the notation that the boolean expression eval-
uates to 1 if true, and 0 if false. Letting p(g,m|2000)
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denote our understanding in 1996 with the additional
knowledge (lep2) of no processes beyond the Standard
Model having been observed in LEP 2, a similar applica-
tion of Bayes’s theorem yields
p(g,m|2000) = p(lep2|1996, g,m)p(g,m|1996)
p(lep2|1996) . (A12)
Here p(g,m|1996) is taken from Eq. A10, and
p(lep2|1996) represents the density left in going from
Fig. 1(c) to Fig. 1(d). The latter shows a plot of
p(g,m|2000), showing that the region with m < 100 GeV
has been zeroed.
Letting p(g,m|2006) denote our understanding in 2006,
comprising our knowledge in 2000 plus the additional
knowledge (tev2a = tev(1 fb−1)) of no signal beyond the
Standard Model having been observed in Tevatron Run
IIa, the posterior distribution p(g,m|2006) obtained is
shown in Fig. 1(e). The fraction of the density left in
going from Fig. 1(d) to Fig. 1(e) is p(tev2a|2000) ≈ 90%.
Letting p(g,m|2010) denote our understanding in 2010,
comprising our knowledge in 2006 and assuming (tev2b =
tev(10 fb−1)) that no processes beyond the Standard
Model are observed in Tevatron Run IIb, the posterior
distribution p(g,m|2010) obtained is shown in Fig. 1(f).
The fraction of the density left in going from Fig. 1(e) to
Fig. 1(f) is p(tev2b|2006) ≈ 88%.
From the calculations above, in 2000 the expectation
for finding new physics in Tevatron Run IIa was equal to
(1− p(tev2a|2000)) ≈ 10%. (A13)
In 2006, the expectation for finding new physics in Teva-
tron Run IIb is
(1− p(tev2b|2006)) ≈ 12%. (A14)
In 2000, the expectation for finding new physics in Teva-
tron Run II is equal to
(1− p(tev2a, tev2b|2000)) =
(1− p(tev2a|2000) p(tev2b|2006)) ≈ 20%. (A15)
Carrying the argument forward, the expectation for find-
ing new physics at the LHC is determined to be roughly
90%.
To recap, the physics content of the argument provided
above is straightforward. Starting with a prior represent-
ing the field’s expectation in 1990 that the first sign of
physics beyond the Standard Model will appear at or
slightly above the electroweak scale, this prior is evolved
through the experimental knowledge gained from Teva-
tron Run I and LEP 2 to update our expectation to the
year 2000. This expectation is then evolved through the
experimental reality of Tevatron Run IIa and a hypo-
thetical null result in Tevatron Run IIb to find that the
fraction of our expectation from 2000 that has been elim-
inated by 2010 is ∼ 20%.
Of the roughly 2×104 kinematic distributions that can
be considered in the Tevatron, it is difficult to convinc-
ingly argue that any one of them is more likely to display
the first sign of new physics than any other. Unless there
are many signs of new physics in the Tevatron data, it
therefore follows that any targeted search — including
the search for single top production, Bs → µ+µ−, and
the measurement of Bs mixing — has a discovery expec-
tation of roughly 20%/2× 104 = 10−5.
2. µ2e
The argument for the µ2e experiment is largely based
on the observation that new electroweak scale physics
with non-negligible lepton flavor violation can give rise
to a transition µ → e in the electric field of an atomic
nucleus sufficiently large to be observable at µ2e. Of the
new electroweak scale physics that may give rise to such
a signal, electroweak scale supersymmetry is so far the
most thoroughly studied possibility.
A poll taken during a series of seminars over the past
six years including over six hundred professional physi-
cists [44] suggests the field’s expectation that weak scale
supersymmetry is realized in nature is roughly 35%.
An independent poll conducted online shows similar re-
sults [30]. Interestingly, it is generally not the case that
one third of the field is confident low energy supersym-
metry is present, and that two thirds are confident low
energy supersymmetry is not; informal discussions sug-
gest most individual physicists would place the odds that
the first sign of new physics will arise from low energy su-
persymmetry at 2:1 against.
Assuming low energy supersymmetry is realized, either
there is significant mixing in the slepton sector (as in the
case of neutrinos in the Standard Model), or for some rea-
son this mixing is suppressed (as in the case of quarks in
the Standard Model). There being no particularly com-
pelling reason to prefer either of these two scenarios over
the other, an expectation of 50% can be assigned to there
being significant mixing in the slepton sector, asssuming
low energy supersymmetry is realized in nature.
Assuming µ2e operates as designed, the expectation
that a µ→ e signal identifying physics beyond the Stan-
dard Model will be seen is thus roughly 35% × 50% =
18%.
Reasonable variations in this argument, including ex-
panding the consideration of new physics scenarios that
may lead to a µ → e signal beyond electroweak scale
supersymmetry, can lead to a final number differing by
roughly a factor of two either way. The important point
is that the discovery expectation cannot reasonably be
argued to be significantly less than ∼ 10% or greater
than ∼ 90% [45].
For a proposed experiment whose outcome is binary, a
prior expectation of roughly 50% corresponds to a scien-
tific merit of 0.30, and the experiment provides a full bit
of information. A proposed experiment with binary out-
come with a prior expectation to see a signal of 10% (or
90%) has a scientific merit of 0.14. The scientific merit
of the proposed µ2e experiment is significantly less than
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the LHC experiments in part due to the relative inability
of the µ2e experiment to further explore the underlying
physics responsible for producing the signal.
3. Historical discoveries
The surprises corresponding to the discoveries of the c,
τ , b, W , Z, and t particles have been estimated by com-
munication with individuals active (both intimately and
as observers) during the time of the discoveries. Written
documents that have been helpful in this regard include
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